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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 





W. SCOTT JEPSON, R.N. 
Respondent/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040808-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
Scott Jepson (Jepson) appeals from a final order in a formal proceeding before the 
Department of Commerce. The Department concluded that Jepson engaged in 
unprofessional and unlawful conduct and issued him a private reprimand. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) 
(West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/ STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Jepson has listed twenty-one (21) separate issues in his brief. The Division 
believes his statement of the issues is repetitive and inaccurate. The Division proposes 
the following statement of the issues in this matter. 
1. Did Jepson properly object to the expert testimony of Elizabeth Baker, R.N., 
regarding the standard of care for home health care nurses in the handling of medications 
prescribed for their patients, preserving the issue for appeal, and if so, did the 
Administrative Law Judge properly receive that testimony in evidence? 
Failure to preserve an issue for appeal is a matter decided in the first instance by 
the appellate court. Thus, there is no standard of review. "[I]ssues not raised in 
proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in 
exceptional circumstances." Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n., 947 P.2d 
671, 677 (Utah 1997); accord Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm 'n., 855 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah 
CtApp. 1993). 
The Administrative Law Judge is granted broad discretion in determining whether 
expert testimony is admissible and appellate courts review such decisions for abuse of 
discretion. See Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1999); Patey v. 
Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. 
Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (limiting testimony of expert 
witness); State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
2. Did the Administrative Law Judge properly exclude the exhibit entitled 
"Security of Other Medications and Supplies"? 
The Administrative Law Judge is granted broad discretion in his decision to admit 
or exclude evidence and the reviewing court should not overturn his decision absent a 
showing of abuse of discretion. See Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 977 P.2d 
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474, 477 (Utah 1999); Stevenettv. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 997 P.2d 508, 511 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999); Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
3. Did the Department act reasonably in determining that the "prudent practitioner 
rule" does not strictly apply in home health care settings and in rejecting Jepson's 
argument that the rule required him to take the morphine sulphate home with him instead 
of leaving it with the patient's family? 
Generally, an agency's interpretation of its own rules, especially where the 
Legislature has granted the agency discretion in that area, is subject to deference by a 
reviewing court. State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). On matters 
of mixed findings of fact and law the agency is empowered to administer, the agency's 
decisions are reviewed for reasonableness. Associated Gen. Contrs. V. Bd. of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 38 P.3d 291 (Utah 2001). 
4. Did Jepson preserve for appeal his assertion that the Administrative Law Judge 
gave him assurances that no finding of theft or taking would be made by the Board? 
Failure to preserve an issue for appeal is a matter decided in the first instance by 
the appellate court. Thus, there is no standard of review. "[I]ssues not raised in 
proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in 
exceptional circumstances." Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n., 947 P.2d 
671, 677 (Utah 1997); accord Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm 'n., 855 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah 
Q. App. 1993). 
5. Did the Department act reasonably in issuing a private reprimand to Jepson 
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and requiring him to notify his employers of that reprimand until five years after the date 
of its order? 
An agency's decision on the sanction to impose against a licensee who it has found 
to have engaged in unlawful conduct is a mixed question of law and fact. The appellate 
court will not disturb the agency's decision unless its determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. Rogers v. Division of Real Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
STATUTES, RULES. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following statutes and rules, 
whose texts are reproduced in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-l-401(2)(a) and (b) (West 2004) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-501 (2)(a) and (g) (West 2004) 
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-31b-502(5) and (7) (West 2004) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16 (West 2004) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-1-1 (West 2004) 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 103(a)(1) (West 2004) 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 901(a) (West 2004) 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R156-37-502(4) (2002) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case concerns whether a home health nurse who has filled a controlled 
substance prescription for a patient under his care is required by the applicable standard 
of care to leave it at home with the patient's family rather than retaining possession of the 
controlled substance. 
On July 5, 2002, the Commerce Department's Division of Occupational and 
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Professional Licensing (DOPL) issued a petition seeking sanctions against Jepson, 
alleging that he had engaged in unprofessional and unlawful acts in his handling of a 
controlled substance prescribed for one of his patients. A hearing on the petition was 
held on April 25, 2003 and May 30, 2003, before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) and the Board of Nursing (Board). 
On June 13, 2003, the Board issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommended order, finding that Jepson had engaged in unprofessional and unlawful 
conduct and recommending the issuance of a public reprimand. On June 16, 2003, 
DOPL's presiding officer in this matter issued an order adopting the Board's findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order. 
Jepson filed a timely request for agency review on July 15, 2003. On July 30, 
2004, the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce ("Department") issued an 
Order on Review upholding DOPL's findings of unprofessional and unlawful conduct, 
but changing the sanction from a public reprimand to a private reprimand. Jepson filed 
his Petition for Judicial Review on September 22, 2004. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jepson's statement of the facts is not accurate. The following statement of the 
facts is more correct. 
Jepson is, and at all times relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed to practice 
as a registered nurse in the State of Utah. (R. 29). From June 2001 through September 
2002, he was employed as a home health nurse for First Choice Home Health. On April 
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5, 2002, First Choice Home Health temporarily assigned him to provide home nursing 
care to H. M., an elderly disabled adult. (R 29). H. M. resided with K. B. and G. B., who 
are her daughter and son-in-law. (R 29). 
On April 11, 2002, Jepson determined that H. M. was unable to swallow her 
medications. (R. 29). He contacted Dr. Erik Hogenson, H. M.'s primary care physician, 
to obtain alternate pain management medication. (R. 29). Based on Jepson's assessment 
of H. M., Dr. Hogenson prescribed Duragesic patches, a Schedule II controlled substance 
containing fentanyl, and injectable morphine sulphate, also a Schedule II controlled 
substance. (R. 29). 
G. B. and Jepson obtained the prescriptions from Dr. Hogenson's office and 
proceeded to a pharmacy to obtain the medications. (R. 29). The pharmacist filled the 
prescription for Duragesic patches, and G. B. later took that medication home. (R. 29-30). 
The injectable morphine sulphate, however, was not available at the pharmacy at that 
time. Jepson attempted to locate the morphine sulphate at other pharmacies, but was 
unable to obtain it in the multi-unit dosage prescribed by Dr. Hogenson. (R. 30). 
After G. B. had returned home, Jepson eventually found a pharmacy that could fill 
the morphine sulphate prescription in a different dosage. He returned to Dr. Hogenson's 
office and obtained a new prescription for H. M. from Dr. James Rose for the morphine 
sulphate in that different dosage. (R. 30). Jepson had the new prescription filled at 
approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 11, 2002, and then took the medicine with him to his 
own home. (R. 30). 
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Jepson left his residence on the morning of April 12, 2002, leaving the morphine 
sulphate for H. M. behind while he checked on patients. (R. 30). In the meantime, H. 
M.'s condition had improved significantly and K. B. and G. B. thought that the morphine 
sulphate was no longer needed. (R. 30). G. B. left a telephone message for Jepson, at 
Jepson's residence, instructing him to not have the morphine sulphate prescription filled 
if he had not yet obtained that medication for H. M. (R. 30). Jepson had not received that 
telephone message by the time he arrived at the home of K. B. and G. B. approximately 
fifteen (15) minutes later. (R. 30). Jepson did not have H. M.'s morphine sulphate with 
him. (R 30). He informed K. B. and G. B. that he had obtained the morphine sulphate but 
had left it at his home. G. B. paid Jepson for the morphine sulphate. (R. 30). 
Jepson returned to H.M.'s home on April 13, 2002. (R. 30). K. B. asked if he had 
brought the morphine sulphate with him. (R. 30). Jepson responded that he could not 
provide the medication to them because that would be an illegal distribution of a 
controlled substance. He said he had destroyed the medication. (R. 31). K. B. and G. B. 
had expected him to leave the medication at their home so that it would be available if H. 
M. later needed it and another home health nurse could administer it to her. (R. 31). 
Subsequently, First Choice Home Health learned of Jepson's handling of the 
morphine sulphate. (R. 31). After conducting its own investigation, First Choice Home 
Health reported the incident to the Division. The Division subsequently issued a Petition 
against Jepson alleging unprofessional and unlawful behavior. (R. 31). The Petition 
contained four separate counts against Jepson. 
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Count I alleged that Jepson possessed controlled substances outside of his 
responsibilities as a nurse. (R. 352). 
Count II alleged that Jepson: (1) failed to administer medication to his patient as 
prescribed by a physician; (2) maintained a patient's narcotics medication at his 
residence; (3) disposed of a controlled substance without a proper witness as is standard 
practice in nursing; and (4) failed to report his suspicion that the patient may be a victim 
of abuse or potential abuse. (R. 352-353). 
Count III alleged that Jepson failed to produce a medication he purchased for a 
patient. (R. 353). 
Count IV alleged that Jepson maintained a controlled substance at his home and 
destroyed the medication without a witness. (R. 353). 
A hearing was conducted on April 23 and May 30, 2003, before the Nursing 
Board. The Board concluded that Counts II and IV should be dismissed and that Counts I 
and III were established. Among other things, the Board found that "[Jepson] failed to 
exercise good judgment when he elected to retain the morphine sulphate in his home 
rather than deliver that medication to [K. B. and G. B.]. [He] simply failed to recognize 
that H. M.'s medication should have been available at the [home of K. B. and G. B.] if H. 
M.'s condition again deteriorated as to subsequently warrant the use of the Duragesic 
patches and the morphine sulphate for breakthrough pain." (R. 192). In its findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and recommended order, the Board recommended that Jepson 
receive a public reprimand. (R. 193). The Board's findings of fact, conclusions of law 
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and recommended order were adopted by the Division's presiding officer in an order 
signed June 16, 2003. (R.180). 
On July 15, 2003, Jepson filed a request for Agency Review. On July 30, 2004, an 
Order was issued by the Executive Director of the Department affirming DOPL's finding 
that Jepson engaged in unprofessional and unlawful conduct, but modifying the public 
reprimand to a private reprimand. (R. 32). The Department also ordered Jepson to notify 
his current employer of the private reprimand and thereafter to so notify any future 
employers for five years. (R. 50). The Department's order also specifically ordered 
Jepson to "deliver controlled substances prescribed for his home health patients to the 
patient's home and [to] maintain them there for administration to the patient as may be 
warranted." (R. 50-51). 
On August 23, 2004, Jepson filed a Request for Reconsideration with the 
Department. (R. 22-27). This was denied by the Department on August 24, 2004. (R. 18-
21). Jepson then filed a Petition for Review with this Court on September 22, 2004. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Department of Commerce found that Jepson, a registered nurse providing 
home health care, engaged in unlawful and unprofessional conduct when he took some 
morphine sulphate that had been prescribed for one of his patients to his own home 
instead of leaving it in the home of the patient. 
Evidence of the standard of care for home health care nurses in the handling of 
medications prescribed for their patients was provided by Elizabeth Baker, R.N., the 
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Division's expert witness. Jepson failed to object to her expert testimony on that subject, 
and even if he had, the testimony was properly accepted by the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
At the hearing, Jepson offered a web page printout as evidence of the standard of 
care. He failed to provide the necessary foundation for the exhibit. Furthermore, the 
exhibit was irrelevant because it addressed the standard of care in institutional settings 
rather than home health care settings. The Administrative Law Judge acted within his 
proper discretion in excluding that exhibit. 
Jepson claims that a DOPL rule required him to take the morphine sulphate home 
with him instead of leaving it with the patient. That rule requires a nurse to maintain 
controls over controlled substances which would be considered by a prudent practitioner 
to be effective against diversion, theft, or shortage of controlled substances. See Utah 
Admin. Code Rl 56-37-502(4). The Board of Nursing disagreed with Jepson's 
interpretation of the rule. It found that under the circumstances of this case, the rule 
called for him to leave the morphine sulphate with the patient's family instead of taking it 
home with him. The Board's interpretation of the rule, which was affirmed by the 
Department, was reasonable. 
On agency review, the Department affirmed the order of the Division except with 
regard to the sanction imposed on Jepson's license. It ordered a private reprimand, rather 
than the public reprimand the Division had ordered. The Department also required 
Jepson to inform his employers about his private reprimand, for a period of five years. 
10 
The requirement that he inform his employers was a reasonable exercise of the 
Department's discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. JEPSON FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF 
ELIZABETH BAKER, R.N., REGARDING THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR 
HOME HEALTH CARE NURSES IN THEIR HANDLING OF MEDICATIONS 
PRESCRIBED FOR THEIR PATIENTS, AND TO PRESERVE THAT ISSUE FOR 
REVIEW. IN ANY EVENT, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROPERLY 
RECEIVED THAT TESTIMONY IN EVIDENCE 
Elizabeth Baker, R. N., ("Nurse Baker") was the expert witness called by DOPL to 
establish the standard of care for home health care nurses in the handling of prescription 
medications for their patients. On appeal, Jepson argues that he made timely objection to 
her testimony and that the Administrative Law Judge improperly accepted her testimony 
regarding the appropriate standard of care. (Aplt. Br. at 24). For the reasons set forth 
below, however, Jepson's claims lack merit. 
1. Jepson made no objection to Elizabeth Baker's testimony as an expert regarding the 
standard of care for home health care nurses in their handling of medications prescribed 
for their patients and he failed to preserve that issue for review. 
It is fundamental that "[a] party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or 
waive its right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoffv. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Lopez v. Schwendiman, 
720 P.2d 718, 781 (Utah 1986)). "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless . . . a timely objection or motion to strike appears of 
record, stating the specific ground of objection... ." Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1); see State v. 
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Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah) (requiring clear and definite objection at trial to 
preserve purported evidentiary error for appeal), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Although Jepson claims that he objected at least six times to Nurse Baker 
testifying as an expert witness, this claim is not borne out by the record.1 A careful 
review of what Jepson calls "Objections to Nurse Baker's Testimony"reveals that he did 
not properly preserve any objection to her testimony as an expert.2 
A. Jepson's First Alleged Objection 
On direct examination, by Assistant Attorney General Lorrie Lima, Nurse Baker was 
asked: 
Q. Once a controlled substance prescription is issued to a patient, does the 
home health nurse determine if and when the medication can either be physically 
delivered to the patient or the caregivers or be retained by the patient or the 
caregivers? 
(April Transcript pg. 98, In. 19-23). Jepson's attorney then objected that the question was 
a legal one: 
Mr. Arron Jepson: I am going to object. I think that's a legal question. Depends 
on what the statute says and the rules say. It's not subject to an opinion on that 
point. 
(April Transcript pg. 98, In. 24-pg. 99, In 2)(emphasis added). Here, Jepson was clearly 
*In Addendum - Exhibit 2 of his brief and in the portions of his brief that refer to that 
exhibit, Jepson describes these six alleged objections to Nurse Baker's testimony. The 
Department has moved to strike those parts of Jepson's brief, but it is addressing those issues 
here in the event the Court does not grant the State's motion to strike. 
2For the convenience of this Court, the pages of the transcript which contain what Jepson 
describes as his six objections to Nurse Baker's testimony are attached as Addendum B. They 
consist of pages 98-100 and 136 of the April Transcript. 
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objecting that the question asked for a legal conclusion rather than opinion testimony. He 
was not, however, objecting as to the witness's qualifications to testify as an expert, or to 
her offering expert testimony. In response to this objection, the ALJ ruled that the 
question was being put to the witness in the capacity of an expert and that she could 
answer it in that context. (April Transcript pg. 99, In. 3-6). 
B. Jepson's Second andThird Alleged Objections 
Immediately after the exchange described above, Jepson's attorney said: "Then, I 
object because she has not been qualified in that area." (April Transcript pg. 99, In. 7-8). 
Although what Jepson's attorney meant by "that area" is unclear, this objection could be 
construed as one to Ms. Baker's qualifications to testify on a particular subject. If that is 
what Jepson had in mind, however, the Administrative Law Judge apparently did not 
understand it that way, because the judge's response to this objection was to say "I think 
she was being offered as one [expert witness], is she not, Miss Lima?" Ms. Lima replied 
"She is." (April Transcript pg. 99, In. 9-11). 
If Jepson had an objection to Nurse Baker offering testimony on any particular 
subject, this was his chance to make a record of it. For example, if he had an objection 
about whether sufficient foundation had been laid to establish her qualifications to testify 
about what he describes in his brief as "the central issue of this case," namely "the 
handling, control and administration of liquid morphine," then his counsel could have 
preserved that issue for appeal by clearly explaining that objection to the Administrative 
Law Judge. This did not happen. Instead, Jepson's counsel effectively dropped his 
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objection by saying "I beg your pardon, Judge. She was offered - - she was not offered, 
but I guess she is now, as a qualified expert witness on home health care." (April 
Transcript pg. 99, In. 12-14). Jepson said nothing to explain or preserve any objection on 
the subject of Nurse Baker's qualifications, and he certainly said nothing about her 
qualifications in the handling, control and administration of liquid morphine. 
After Jepson's attorney acknowledged, as quoted above, that Nurse Baker was 
being offered as a qualified expert witness on home health care, the ALJ said, "I think 
that's what she is here to testify-." Jepson replied "Yeah. The question here is where 
the legal duty lies as to who makes what determination and I think we can-." (April 
Transcript pg. 99, In. 15-19). In his brief, Jepson characterizes his just-quoted statement 
as being part of his "Third Objection." (Aplt. Br., Addendum Exhibit 2.) This was not an 
objection, however, but a comment on the subject matter of the question that had been 
asked of the witness. 
What Jepson characterizes as his Second and Third Objections, then, were not 
objections to Nurse Baker's qualifications to testify about the standard of care for the 
handling of controlled substances, much less for the handling, control and administration 
of liquid morphine. Jepson failed to preserve any record of such an objection. 
The balance of the questions that Jepson claims are objections to Ms. Baker's 
qualifications as an expert actually relate to other issues. 
C. Jepson's Fourth Alleged Objection 
Jepson's next alleged objection states: 
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Mr. Arron Jepson: Exactly. And the word authority means nurses are controlled 
by statute and regulations and so the proper question should be, if it's asked, what 
is the statute or where is the regulation and what does it say, not do you have an 
opinion about what the law is, so I maintain my objection. 
(April Transcript pg. 99, In. 25 - pg. 100, In. 5). This objection is not to the witness's 
expertise, but is an objection that the question is asking for a legal conclusion. 
D. Jepson's Fifth Alleged Objection 
Jepson's next "objection" is really an objection that the rephrasing of a previous 
question was inaccurate. Nurse Baker had asked for clarification of the question, and the 
following exchange ensued: 
Witness: If I understand the question correctly, are you asking me if a pharmacist 
prescribes - - or if a physician prescribes a medication for a patient is there any 
reason why I don't think that patient should have that medication? 
Ms. Lima: Yes. 
Mr. Arron Jepson: Objection. That is not what the question was. The question 
was a determination of authority to act, not what her opinion is. 
(April Transcript pg. 100, In. 9-17). This is not an objection to Nurse Baker's expertise, 
but an objection that a question had not been accurately rephrased. 
E. Jepson's Sixth Alleged Objection 
Jepson's final "objection" came later in the hearing and was in response to a line 
of questions to Nurse Baker about the potential lethal effects of Duragesic patches and 
Lortab. Here, Jepson's attorney stated: "Objection. She has already clearly stated that 
she doesn't have the background in administering narcotics to have any expert 
testimony." (April Transcript pg. 136, In. 3-5). In this instance, the ALJ did not make a 
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ruling on Mr. Jepson's objection, but rather allowed further foundational questions to be 
asked of Nurse Baker regarding her experience with the questioned drugs. (April 
Transcript pg. 136, In. 6-14). If Jepson had any objection at that point, it was his 
responsibility to make that clear and to seek a ruling on his objection. He never did so. 
Only one of Jepson's objections went to the issue of Nurse Baker's qualifications 
to be an expert witness. That objection did not address the specific concern which Jepson 
raises on appeal regarding Nurse Baker's qualifications, and he effectively dropped that 
objection without following up on it. Not only did Jepson fail to properly preserve an 
objection to Nurse Baker testifying as an expert on the standard of care for home health 
nurse in their handling of medications prescribed for their patients, but Jepson's attorney 
even asked asked Nurse Baker a question regarding that standard of care.2 
Q. Now, you have said that all medications, regardless of what they are, 
prescribed for the patient in your opinion need to be left in the home. Is 
that correct? 
A. If the medication is ordered for a patient, it should be in their home. 
(April Transcript, pg. 117, In. 7 - 11). 
Since Jepson did not preserve an objection to Nurse Baker's qualifications to 
testify as an expert witness on the relevant standard of care, and since he himself elicited 
expert opinion from her on that standard of care, his challenges on appeal to her 
testimony ring hollow. 
2The ALJ allowed questions to be asked of the witnesses by both the Appellant, W. Scott 
Jepson and his attorney. 
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2. Even if Jepson had made a proper objection, the ALJ properly allowed Nurse Baker to 
offer expert testimony regarding the standard of care for home health care nurses in the 
handling of medications prescribed for their patients. 
As a general matter, trial courts are to be given a wide measure of discretion in 
determining whether a particular witness qualifies as an expert. Thurston v. Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 2003 UT App 438, 83 P.3d 391(Utah Ct. App. 2003). In the 
case at hand, the ALJ properly permitted Nurse Baker's expert testimony. 
DOPL provided advance notice to Jepson of its intent to call Nurse Baker as an 
expert witness at the April 25, 2003 hearing. The notice, entitled "Expert Witness 
Disclosure," was sent to Jepson on March 11, 2003. The notice advised Jepson that the 
expert would testify regarding her work experience as a home health care nurse and her 
evaluation of the care provided by Jepson as alleged in the petition (R. 292-299). The 
Division sent this notice pursuant to Department of Commerce Administrative Procedures 
Act Rule R151-46b-9(3)(a). 
When Nurse Baker testified proper foundation was laid for her testimony as an 
expert. She testified regarding her education and background in nursing. She testified 
regarding her extensive background in home health care nursing.3 The balance of her 
foundational testimony described her review of records and documents relating to the care 
3Jepson asserts that because Nurse Baker was not established as an expert on liquid 
morphine she was thus unqualified to offer expert testimony. (Aplt. Br. at 34). He is mistaken in 
claiming that proof of such a narrow area of expertise was required. The relevant rules relate to 
controlled substances, not just liquid morphine. The focus of the case was on the handling of 
controlled substances in a home health care setting, and Nurse Baker was shown to possess 
substantial experience as a nurse and in dealing with certain controlled substances. (April 
Transcript pg. 90, In. 24 - pg. 93, In. 9; 136, In 6-9). 
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of H. M. by Jepson. Nurse Baker's testimony described the general standard of care in 
home health care nursing matters and multiple aspects of the particular standard of care 
required in H. M.'s case. She testified that when medications are prescribed for the 
patient, regardless of what they are, they need to be left in the patient's home. (April 
Transcript, pg 117, In. 7-11).4 
Jepson has not shown that the ALJ abused his discretion in allowing Nurse Baker's 
expert testimony. Her testimony was properly received in evidence. 
Note that Jepson's argument on appeal regarding Nurse Baker's testimony about 
the standard of care for home health care nurses in the handling of medications prescribed 
for their patients focuses on his assertions that he objected to her qualifications to offer 
such testimony, and that her testimony should stricken from the record. (Aplt. Br. at 23). 
Jepson does not offer any reasoning, however, as to why her testimony, assuming it was 
properly accepted as evidence, does not constitute substantial evidence of the relevant 
standard of care. The Department submits that Nurse Baker's testimony, such as her 
statement that "[i]f the medication is ordered for a patient, it should be in their home" is 
substantial evidence of that standard of care. Since it is undisputed that Jepson kept the 
morphine sulphate himself instead of leaving it in the patient's home, Nurse Baker's 
testimony provided substantial evidence to support the Department's finding that Jepson 
4Jepson asserts in his brief that Nurse Baker's testimony was "personal oppinion" rather 
than expert testimony. (Aplt. Br. at 33). His assertion is not supported by the context of her 
testimony. As shown above, she was clearly viewed by DOPL, the ALJ, and Jepson as an expert 
witness and was treated as such by all of them. 
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engaged in unlawful and unprofessional conduct. {See April Transcript pg. 117 lin 7-11; 
pg. 240 In 4-14; (R. 41-42). 
Not only are the Department's findings of unlawful and unprofessional conduct 
supported by substantial evidence, but in any event, Jepson's failure to marshal the 
evidence would justify this Court in affirming those findings as written. State ex rel L. 
M, 37 P.3d 1188 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
II. JEPSON'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT "SECURITY OF OTHER MEDICATIONS 
AND SUPPLIES" WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE BASED ON 
A LACK OF FOUNDATION AND THE EXHIBIT'S APPLICABILITY TO ONLY 
INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT 
During Jepson's questioning at the hearing on May 30, 2003, his counsel sought to 
have a web page printout entered into evidence which he claimed to be the standard of 
care for the handling of controlled substances in home health care. The ALJ excluded the 
printout as evidence. (May Transcript pg. 56, In. 18). Whether an exhibit should be 
excluded on the basis that it lacks adequate foundation is primarily within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. The ruling of the trial court will not be overturned on appeal 
absent an abuse of discretion. Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 977 P.2d 508 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999). 
The ALJ's decision to exclude this exhibit was a sound exercise of his discretion. 
First, no foundation was laid for the introduction of this exhibit. There was no 
explanation of who created the document. There was no evidence of the purpose for 
which it was created. There was no evidence given regarding the date the document was 
created. Indeed, Jepson offered none of the foundation that is required to establish the 
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authenticity of a document as a condition precedent to admissibility . See, Rule 901(a) 
Utah Rules of Evidence (West 2004). 
Second, the document was irrelevant. It was published on the "Home Care Page" 
web page of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. The 
content of the rejected exhibit, however, shows that it does not apply to home health care 
settings. The proposed exhibit applies to only institutional settings. For example, the 
exhibit refers to public access, patient waiting areas, patient examination rooms, and 
private offices. Therefore, the decision of Judge Eklund to exclude the document as 
establishing the standards applicable in a home health care setting was reasonable and not 
an abuse of his discretion. 
Even if it had been error to exclude the printout as evidence, Jepson has failed to 
meet his burden of showing that the error was prejudicial. The Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act provides that, in an appeal of an agency order, "[t]he appellate court shall 
grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 
(West 2004). In Stevenett, 977 P.2d at 511, the court held that "the person asserting error 
has the burden to show not only that the error occurred but also that it was substantial and 
prejudicial." See also State v. Kiriluk, 975 P. 2d 469, 472-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). "In 
other words, [appellate courts] must be able to determine that the alleged error was not 
harmless." Aha Pac. Assocs. Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 931 P.2d 103, 116 (Utah 
1997). 
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In this case there was testimony from various witnesses, including that of Nurse 
Baker, regarding the standard of care nurses should follow in handling prescription 
medications they have obtained for home health care patients under their care. For 
example, Nurse Baker testified that such medications should be left in the home with the 
patient. (April Transcript, pg. 117, In. 7 - 11). As is explained above in this brief, there 
was substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion, which was approved by the 
presiding officer and affirmed by the Department, that the morphine sulphate should have 
been available at the patient's home in case her condition were to later warrant 
administration of that medication. (R. 192). The Board believed and accepted the 
testimony of Nurse Baker regarding this standard of care. The Board was not required to 
believe Jepson's evidence over that offered by the Division. Jepson has made no showing 
that the admission of the disputed exhibit caused him to suffer substantial prejudice. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED REASONABLY IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE "PRUDENT PRACTITIONER RULE55 DOES NOT STRICTLY APPLY IN 
HOME HEALTH CARE SETTINGS AND IN REJECTING JEPSON5S 
ARGUMENT THAT THE RULE REQUIRED HIM TO TAKE THE MORPHINE 
SULPHATE HOME WITH HIM INSTEAD OF LEAVING IT WITH THE 
PATIENT'S FAMILY. 
Jepson argues that when he took home with him the morphine sulphate that had 
been prescribed for his patient H. M., he was actually doing so in an effort to comply with 
Rule R156-37-502(4)("prudent practitioner rule"). He raises this argument in an effort to 
defend against the Board's finding that he unlawfully took and possessed the morphine 
sulphate when he took the controlled substance to his home and maintained possession of 
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it, instead of delivering it to the home of his patient and leaving it with the family. His 
argument is without merit and is no defense to the findings against him.5 
Rule Rl56-37-502(4), the "prudent practitioner rule" requires nurses and other 
health care professionals to maintain certain controls over controlled substances. It 
establishes a "prudent practitioner" standard for determining what controls over 
controlled substances would be appropriate under any given set of circumstances. The 
rule reads as follows: 
"Unprofessional conduct" includes: 
(4) failing to maintain controls over controlled substances which would be 
considered by a prudent practitioner to be effective against diversion, theft, or 
shortage of controlled substances; 
Utah Admin Code Rl 56-37-502(4). A nurse must thus consider whether a given situation 
poses a risk of diversion, theft or shortage, and must maintain such controls over the 
controlled substances as a prudent practitioner would consider necessary to effectively 
protect against those risks. 
The rule allows practitioners to address varying circumstances in different ways 
depending on the risks involved. The Board's interpretation of the prudent practitioner 
rule and its resulting conclusion that the Rule does not apply strictly in a home 
furthermore, Jepson's argument that the "prudent practitioner rule" required him to 
retain physical possession of the morphine sulphate is belied by his own actions in leaving the 
Duragesic patches in the home of K. B. and G. B. (May Transcript, pg. 18, In. 2-6). The 
Duragesic prescription was a Schedule II controlled substance, the same as the morphine 
sulphate, and was subject to the same statutory controls for safety as the morphine sulphate. 
Jepson, however chose to leave the Duragesic patches with the patient's family while retaining 
possession of the morphine sulphate. 
22 
health care setting, both of which were affirmed by the Department, are reasonable. The 
environment in a patient's home is different from that in an institution. In an institutional 
setting, patients, families and friends of patients, vendors, office staff, maintenance staff, 
and the general public could potentially come into contact with an unsecured controlled 
substance. Therefore, stricter controls in the form of security measures would be 
appropriate in such a setting to keep controlled substances in a designated area where 
only authorized personnel can access them. On the other hand, in a home health care 
setting, the risk of public access is practically non-existent. The patient or her caregivers 
control access to the home and to the medications in the home. Therefore, the Division's 
conclusion that the "prudent practitioner rule" does not strictly apply to home health care 
situations — in other words, its interpretation that strict controls over controlled 
substances are not required in a home setting — is reasonable and well within its 
discretion. The Board was acting within its reasonable discretion when it rejected 
Jepson's argument that the "prudent practitioner rule" required him to take the morphine 
sulphate home with him instead of leaving it with his patient and her family. There is no 
evidence that leaving the medication in the home would have posed any risk of diversion, 
theft or shortage. Such a conclusion is consistent with the plain meaning of the rule. 
"When reviewing the [agency's] application of its own rules, this court will not disturb 
the agency's interpretation or application of one of the agency's rules unless its 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Brown & Root 
Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm % 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). 
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It is necessary to address one other point regarding the Board's statement that the 
"prudent practitioner rule" does not strictly apply in a home health care setting. The 
Board made that statement in the context of explaining why it felt there was insufficient 
evidence to show a violation of Count Four of DOPL's petition. (R. 190-191). This count 
was based on an allegation that Jepson had maintained a controlled substance in his home 
and destroyed it without a witness, in violation of the "prudent practitioner rule." The 
Board's discussion of its reasons for finding there was insufficient evidence to show a 
violation of that rule included the statement that "Rl 56-37-502(4) does not strictly apply 
in a home health care setting . . . ."(R. 191). 
Jepson misapprehends the purpose and effect of this statement, which was simply a 
part of the Board's explanation of its reasons for finding in his favor on Count Four. He 
argues that, in making this statement, the Board (1) usurped legislative authority, (2) 
purported to substantively change the rule, (3) suspended the rule from applying to home 
health nurses, (4) failed to follow the procedural requirements of the Rulemaking Act, (5) 
created three new crimes, and (6) retrospectively applied a change in the rule to Jepson, in 
violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws in the U. S. Constitution. (Aplt. Br. 
at 38-41). 
As explained above, Rule Rl56-37-502(4) uses an objective "prudent practitioner" 
test to define the controls a nurse must maintain over controlled substances in various 
circumstances. Expert testimony at the hearing provided substantial evidence that the 
standard of care in home health care settings is to leave medications, including controlled 
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substances, in the home with the patient and the patient's family. The statement in the 
Board's conclusions of law was nothing more or less than the Board's interpretation of 
what the "prudent practitioner rule" would require in a home health care setting. As the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized in Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 129 (Utah 1983), it 
is not necessary that every aspect of professional performance be codified in detail and 
members of the same profession in the process of administrative adjudication will 
interpret standards of performance. Such interpretations by regulatory boards are 
appropriate and Jepson's assertions that the Board's interpretation of the rule was 
unlawful and unconstitutional are without merit. Besides, since the Board's statement 
was made in the context of explaining why it was ruling in Jepson's favor on one of the 
counts against him, it did not prejudice him in any event. 
IV. JEPSON FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL HIS CLAIM THAT THE 
ALJ ASSURED HIM THAT NO FINDING OF THEFT OR TAKING WOULD BE 
MADE BY THE BOARD 
Jepson claims that during an off-record discussion he was assured by the ALJ that 
the Board would not make a finding of theft or taking. (Aplt. Br. at 46). Jepson failed to 
include evidence of this supposed promise in the record and failed to preserve this issue 
for appeal. As a result, it is not properly before this court. 
V. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED REASONABLY IN REQUIRING JEPSON 
TO NOTIFY HIS EMPLOYERS OF HIS PRIVATE REPRIMAND. 
When a licensee is found to have engaged in unlawful or unprofessional conduct, 
the law allows DOPL to fashion an appropriate remedy to address the situation. DOPL: 
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may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or private 
reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-401(2)(West 2004). 
Jepson challenges the reasonableness of the Department's choice of sanctions 
against him. He appears to be claiming that if the Department chooses to issue a private 
reprimand, it cannot require disclosure of that reprimand to anyone. He fails, however, to 
provide any reasoning or authority to support his argument, other than making assertions 
to the effect that "[p]rivate means private" and that disclosure to another person means 
that something is not private. (Aplt. Br. at 48). 
Jepson's argument lacks merit. For the reasons set forth below, the issuance of a 
private reprimand was reasonable and was an appropriate exercise of the statute's express 
grant of discretion to the agency. 
There are two important reasons why a regulatory agency might wish to issue a 
private reprimand against a licensee. First, the agency has an interest in putting the 
licensee on notice that he has engaged in inappropriate conduct, so as to discourage the 
licensee from repeating the misconduct. A private reprimand has this effect. 
Second, the agency has an interest in maintaining a record that the licensee has 
engaged in inappropriate conduct warranting a private reprimand. If the licensee engages 
in the same inappropriate conduct in the future, a more serious sanction might then be 
justified. The record of the previous private reprimand would be an aggravating factor 
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the agency could reasonably take into account in deciding what sanction to impose at that 
time. 
Both of these purposes for a private reprimand help protect the public. As the 
Legislature has recognized, "the general public interest must be recognized and regarded 
as the primary purpose of all regulation by state government/' and this responsibility for 
protecting the public is set forth in the legislative findings and declarations in the Chapter 
of the Utah Code which creates the Department of Commerce. Utah Code Ann. § 13-1-1 
(West 2004). 
It is entirely consistent with these purposes of a private reprimand to require the 
licensee to notify his employers about the reprimand. The strong public policy interest in 
protecting the public is furthered by enlisting the watchful eye of the licensee's employer. 
The employer is in a position to implement appropriate safeguards to help avoid 
repetitions of the inappropriate conduct. 
In addition, making the employer aware of a licensee's disciplinary situation 
enables the employer to provide training, support and encouragement to help the licensee 
avoid future similar misconduct. This is a salutary effect which benefits the licensee by 
helping him to stay in the profession and improve his work performance. 
The Department's decision to issue a private reprimand , with a requirement of 
employer notification, was a reasonable way of dealing with Jepson's unlawful and 
unprofessional conduct. It meets two public policy goals-it protects the public, and gives 
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Jepson a second chance. Jepson has failed to meet his burden of showing the sanction 
was unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah asks that the order finding that the 
Appellant has engaged in unprofessional and unlawful conduct and issuing a private 
reprimand be affirmed. 




BLAINE R. FERGUSON 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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58-1-401. Grounds for denial of license — Disciplinary 
proceedings — Time limitations — Sanctions. 
(1) The division shall refuse to issue a license to an applicant and 
shall refuse to renew or shall revoke, suspend, restrict, place on 
probation, or otherwise act upon the license of a licensee who does 
not meet the qualifications for licensure under this title. 
(2) The division may refuse to issue a license to an applicant and 
may refuse to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on 
probation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act 
upon the license of any licensee in any of the following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct, 
as defined by statute or rule under this title; 
(b) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unlawful conduct as 
defined by statute under this title; 
(c) the applicant or licensee has been determined to be mentally 
incompetent for any reason by a court of competent jurisdiction; or 
(d) the applicant or licensee is unable to practice the occupation or 
profession with reasonable skill and safety because of illness, 
drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, narcotics, chemicals, or any 
other type of material, or as a result of any other mental or physical 
condition, when the licensee's condition demonstrates a threat or 
potential threat to the public health, safety, or welfare. 
58-1-501. Unlawful and unprofessional conduct. 
(2) "Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, by a licensee or 
applicant, that is defined as unprofessional conduct under this title 
or under any rule adopted under this title and includes: 
(a) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate, any 
statute, rule, or order regulating an occupation or profession under 
this title; 
(b) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate, any 
generally accepted professional or ethical standard applicable to an 
occupation or profession regulated under this title; 
(c) engaging in conduct that results in conviction, a plea of nolo 
contendere, or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which is held in 
abeyance pending the successful completion of probation with 
respect to a crime of moral turpitude or any other crime that, when 
considered with the functions and duties of the occupation or 
profession for which the license was issued or is to be issued, bears 
a reasonable relationship to the licensee's or applicant's ability to 
safely or competently practice the occupation or profession; 
(d) engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action, 
including reprimand, censure, diversion, probation, suspension, or 
revocation, by any other licensing or regulatory authority having 
jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same occupation 
or profession if the conduct would, in this state, constitute grounds 
for denial of licensure or disciplinary proceedings under Section 
58-1-401; 
(e) engaging in conduct, including the use of intoxicants, drugs, 
narcotics, or similar chemicals, to the extent that the conduct does, 
or might reasonably be considered to, impair the ability of the 
licensee or applicant to safely engage in the occupation or profession; 
(f) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession 
regulated under this title despite being physically or mentally unfit 
to do so; 
(g) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession 
regulated under this title through gross incompetence, gross 
negligence, or a pattern of incompetency or negligence; 
58-31b-502. Unprofessional conduct. 
"Unprofessional conduct" includes: 
(1) failure to safeguard a patient's right to privacy as to the patient's 
person, condition, diagnosis, personal effects, or any other matter 
about which the licensee is privileged to know because of the 
licensee's position or practice as a nurse; 
(2) failure to provide nursing service in a manner that demonstrates 
respect for the patient's human dignity and unique personal 
character and needs without regard to the patient's race, religion, 
ethnic background, socioeconomic status, age, sex, or the nature of 
the patient's health problem; 
(3) engaging in sexual relations with a patient during any: 
(a) period when a generally recognized professional relationship 
exists between the nurse and patient; or 
(b) extended period when a patient has reasonable cause to believe 
a professional relationship exists between the nurse and patient; 
(4) (a) as a result of any circumstance under Subsection (3), 
exploiting or using information about a patient or exploiting the 
licensee's professional relationship between the licensee and the 
patient; or 
(b) exploiting the patient by use of the licensee's knowledge of the 
patient obtained while acting as a nurse; 
(5) unlawfully obtaining, possessing, or using any prescription drug 
or illicit drug; 
(6) unauthorized taking or personal use of nursing supplies from an 
employer; 
(7) unauthorized taking or personal use of a patient's personal property; 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for 
review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form 
required by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all 
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has 
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is 
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
13-1-1. Legislative findings and declarations. 
The Legislature finds that many businesses and occupations in the 
state have a pronounced physical and economic impact on the 
health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state. The 
Legislature further finds that while the overall impact is generally 
beneficial to the public, the potential for harm and injury frequently 
warrants intervention by state government. 
The Legislature declares that it is appropriate and necessary for 
state government to protect its citizens from harmful and injurious 
acts by persons offering or providing essential or necessary goods 
and services to the general public. The Legislature further declares 
that business regulation should not be unfairly discriminatory. 
However, the general public interest must be recognized and 
regarded as the primary purpose of all regulation by state 
government. 
RULE 103. RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a 
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the 
specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; 
RULE 901. REQUIREMENT OF AUTHENTICATION 
OR IDENTIFICATION 
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or 
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied 
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims. 
Rl56-37-502, Unprofessional Conduct 
"Unprofessional conduct" includes: 
(1) a licensee with authority to prescribe or administer controlled 
substances: 
(a) prescribing or administering to himself any Schedule II or m 
controlled substance which is not lawfully prescribed by another 
licensed practitioner having authority to prescribe the drug; 
(b) prescribing or administering a controlled substance for a 
condition he is not licensed or competent to treat; 
(2) violating any federal or state law relating to controlled 
substances; 
(3) failing to deliver to the division all controlled substance license 
certificates issued by the division to the division upon an action 
which revokes, suspends or limits the license; 
(4) failing to maintain controls over controlled substances which 
would be considered by a prudent practitioner to be effective 
against diversion, theft, or shortage of controlled substances; 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
1 that patient. When it comes to pain medications, if I were 
2 to be doing some teaching I would recommend that they 
3 do what Karen does, which would be you write down 
4 medications and when you give them. I think it's important 
5 that you would go over the side effects of these medications 
6 with the caregiver. If the patient was able to understand, 
7 go over them with her. Itfs real important to know, is the 
8 pain medication working, you know, any problems with it. 
9 Q. Thank you. 
10 Who is responsible for maintaining security 
11 and administration of controlled substances? 
12 A. I would say whoever the controlled substance 
13 is issued to. It!s their medication. 
14 Q. So in the situation where a medication such 
15 as Duragesic patches is prescribed and the medication is 
16 maintained at the home where the patient resides, who is 
17 responsible for maintaining the security of that drug? 
18 A. The family. 
19 Q. Once a controlled substance prescription is 
20 issued to a patient, does the home health nurse determine if 
21 and when the medication can either be physically delivered 
22 to the patient or the caregivers or be retained by the 
23 patient or the caregivers? 
24 Mr. Arron Jepson: I am going to object. I 
25 think that's a legal question. Depends on what the statute 
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1 says and the rules say. Itfs not subject to an opinion on 
2 that point. 
3 Administrative Law Judge: I think the 
4 question was put to the witness in the capacity as an expert 
5 and I think she can answer to the extent she understands the 
6 question. 
7 Mr. Jepson: Then I object because she has 
8 not been qualified in that area. 
9 Administrative Law Judge: I think she was 
10 being offered as one, is she not, Miss Lima? 
11 Ms. Lima: She is. 
12 Mr. Arron Jepson: I beg your pardon, Judge. 
13 She was offered -- she was not offered, but I guess she is 
14 now, as a qualified expert witness on home health nurse. 
15 Administrative Law Judge: I think that's 
16 what she is here to testify --
17 Mr. Jepson: Yeah. The question here is 
18 where the legal duty lies as to who makes what determination 
19 and I think we can --
20 Administrative Law Judge: The question was 
21 put in the context of a home health nurse and the question, 
22 as I recall it, was does the home health care nurse have the 
23 authority to decide when or how to administer controlled 
24 substances. 
25 Mr. Arron Jepson: Exactly. And the word 
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regulations and so the proper question should be, if it's 
asked, what is the statute or where is the regulation and 
what does it say, not do you have an opinion about what the 
law is, so I maintain my objection. 
Administrative Law Judge: I think the 
witness can answer the question and the source and the basis 
for her answer can then be explored and then I'll allow it. 
The Witness: If I understand the question 
correctly, are you asking me if a pharmacist prescribes --
or if a physician prescribes a medication for a patient is 
there any reason why I don't think that patient should have 
that medication? 
Ms. Lima: Yes. 
Mr. Arron Jepson: Objection. That is not 
what the question was. The question was a determination of 
authority to act, not what her opinion is. 
Ms. Lima: Miss Baker, let me rephrase the 
question --or let me modify it. 
Q. What is the standard of care when -- in a 
situation where a patient is issued controlled substances by 
his or her physician? Is the nurse -- does the nurse have 
any say as to whether or not the family can retain the drug? 
A. Well, the nurse -- the person probably 





























You know, you probably could, 
status. 
Mr. Scott Jepson: Objection. 
depending on 
She has 
already clearly stated that she doesn't have the background 
in administering narcotics to have any expert testimony. 
Q. (By Ms. Luke) Have you used Fentanyl 
patches? 
A. I have used the patch. The morphine I used 
was sub q morphine on a pump. 
Q. So in and of themselves can either Lortab or 
Fentanyl patches be fatal if you overdose them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can they in combination cause a fatality? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you worked for a facility that had no 
separate wasting form or procedure in place, what would be 
the nursing practice that you think meets minimum standard 
of care in handling a wasting situation? 
A. Well, I would have a competent witness. 
Mr. Arron Jepson: Excuse me. Ifm sorry. I 
have to object. The question phrased says minimum standard 
of care. There is only one standard of care. Is there a 
minimum and maximum? And if there is, then the question 
assumes facts not in evidence. 
Administrative Law Judge: Tell the witness 
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